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The Establishment Clause as Heckler's Veto
"When rights are incorporated against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain,
individual liberty."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the First Amendment explicitly protects individuals
against only laws made by "Congress,"2 the Supreme Court has
long held that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states are forbidden from "depriving" persons
of the fundamental individual liberties protected by the First
Amendment.' Thus, under the so-called doctrine of
incorporation, a particular provision of the First Amendment (as
well as of the rest of the Bill of Rights) "is made applicable to the
states [only] if the Justices are of the opinion that it was meant to
protect a 'fundamental' aspect of liberty."4
However, sometimes the Court applies the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment against the states in ways that
seem to restrict rather than protect liberty. Remarkably,
sometimes the Court even interprets the Establishment Clause as
requiring it to act as a judicial censor issuing heckler's vetoes
which grant one group of citizens the power to deprive another
group of citizens an opportunity to view and enjoy a state-
sponsored display or memorial in a public park or building. The
purpose of this article is to search for liberty under the
incorporated First Amendment, and to seek to discern when
liberty is advanced and when it is restricted by Supreme Court
decisions concerning passive displays and monuments erected by
state governments as part of a pluralistic public culture.
1. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas,J., concurring).
2. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
4. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.6(a), at 855 (5th ed. 2012). Justice John Paul Stevens
has stated that "the idea of liberty" is the source of the incorporation doctrine. John Paul
Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE 13, 33 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
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II. PASSIVE DISPLAYS AND LIBERTY: A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Suppose that a local public high school has put up a "Gay
Pride-Stop Homophobia" poster in the hallway to celebrate gay
pride month. When several conservative Christian students at the
school are offended by the display, their parents complain to the
school board, and the school board orders the principal to take
the gay pride poster down immediately because its message
offends the Christian students and their parents and makes them
feel like unwelcome outsiders in the public school.
Here is the question I ask my students when we discuss this
problem in class: is the school board's decision, ordering the
principal to take down the poster, one that is advancing liberty
or one that is restricting liberty? What would the ACLU and
other organizations advocating for the freedom of speech argue
in such a case?
What about the liberty of the offended students and their
parents-isn't it a good thing for the school board to protect
them from having to view the offensive poster? What about their
liberty not to look at the poster? Doesn't the poster amount to
an endorsement by the government of gay pride and a
disapproval of the religious beliefs of the Christian students and
their families?
What about the courts? Suppose the Christian families sued in
federal court seeking to enjoin the school from displaying the
gay pride poster under the Free Exercise Clause, because the
school's endorsement of the poster harmed the religious
sensibilities of the Christian families? Should the courts enjoin
the school from displaying the poster in order to protect the free
exercise right of the Christian students not to have their
religious beliefs offended by the school's endorsement of gay
pride and disapproval of homophobia?
How should the issues raised above be decided under the
incorporated Free Speech Clause? Where does liberty reside in
this problem?
A. Freedom of Speech and Censorship of Governmental Displays: Herein
ofPico, Barnette and Cohen
In the above hypothetical, I believe that organizations
supporting freedom of speech, such as, perhaps, the ACLU,
would argue that the school board's decision censoring the gay
258 Vol. 18
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pride poster violates the freedom of speech of the students who
wish to be a willing audience for the display, and does not violate
any First Amendment right of the Christian students and their
families who could easily avert their eyes to avoid seeing the
display that offends them. I believe that this is a classic "heckler's
veto" situation, one in which the cause of liberty is on the side of
those who wish to receive the speech and not on the side of the
offended observers who wish to impose their view of acceptable
speech on everyone else in the community. Although it is not
clear that the Free Speech Clause would forbid the school from
removing its own gay pride display, it is abundantly clear that the
willing audience for the display has a strong liberty interest on its
side and that the hecklers have no real liberty interest on theirs.
As Justice Douglas observed in his majority opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut, "[t]he right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to
distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to read."5 In other
words, both willing speakers and willing audiences have First
Amendment rights: speakers to speak; and audiences to listen, to
view, and to read. This is important when the speaker chooses
not to defend the right to speak because, in such cases, the
willing audience for the speech may be able to assert the right to
receive the censored expression.
The closest case to our hypothetical involving censorship of
the gay pride display is Board of Education v. Pico, a case involving
a school board's decision to remove certain library books from
public high school and junior high school libraries.6 The
censored books, including works by Kurt Vonnegut, Langston
Hughes, and Richard Wright,7 were removed by the school
board to appease the concerns of a group of "politically
conservative" parents who objected to the content of the books.8
The school board explained that it decided to remove the books
because they are "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic,
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (stating that the First
Amendment "embraces the right to distribute literature ... and necessarily protects the
right to receive it" (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943))). See
generally Jamie Kennedy, The Right to Receive Information: The Current State of the Doctrine and
the Best Application for the Future, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 789 (2005).
6. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856-57 (1982) (plurality opinion).
7. The censored books included Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five, Langston
Hughes' Best Short Stories of Negro Writers, Richard Wright's Black Boy, and Eldridge
Cleaver's Soul On Ice. Id. at 856 n.3.
8. Id. at 856.
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and just plain filthy."'
Although there was no majority opinion on the First
Amendment issues in the case,10 Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion in Pico is of landmark quality and is often studied in First
Amendment courses in law schools. The plurality made clear
that its decision concerned only the "removal from school
libraries of books originally placed there by the school
authorities" and not decisions by school authorities concerning
"the acquisition of books."" However, Justice Brennan stated that
when school boards remove books from school libraries "simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books,"" they
violate the First Amendment "'right [of students] to receive
information and ideas.'"' The plurality opinion made clear that:
"'The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider
them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers. "14
Justice Brennan emphasized that removal of books was
forbidden only if the school board intended "to deny
respondents access to ideas"'- and noted that "such access
prepares students for active and effective participation in the
pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be
adult members."' 6 In other words, pluralism is a reason to allow
access to contested ideas, not a reason to deny access to such
expression.
The plurality's opinion is a very narrow one. It does not
interfere with the power of the school board to define the
school's curriculum, or to choose textbooks, or even to remove
9. Id. at 857.
10. Justice White, the fifth vote in the case to affirm the court of appeals' decision
denying summary judgment to the school board, explicitly declined to reach the First
Amendment issues in the case. Id. at 883 (White,J., concurring).
11. Id. at 862 (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 872.
13. Id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). As the plurality
emphasized, "the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's
meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom." Id.
14. Id. (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
15. Id. at 871 ("Our Constitution does not permit the official suppression of ideas.").
16. Id. at 868. See also Right To Read Def. Comm. v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
714 (D. Mass. 1978) (stating that the removal of books from a public school library
interfered with right of library patrons "to read and be exposed to controversial
thoughts").
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library books based upon its judgment of their "educational
suitability."' 7  The decision only forbids removal decisions
"exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner" or
intended to suppress unpopular or unwelcome ideas.'8 Still, Pico
strongly supports the idea that censorship of public school
library books (or school displays) restricts a real liberty interest:
the interest of the willing audience whose right to receive speech
is deprived when the censored expression is removed.19 The
removal of books from a school library, or of the hypothetical
gay pride display from the school's hallway, "implicates the right
to receive information because the state is hindering access to
information previously available."o2
But what about the impressionable Christian students, at least
some of whom feel deeply offended and unwelcome by their
school's celebration of gay pride and disapproval of homophobia
and traditional sexual morality? Should a public school be
allowed to send a message endorsing the idea that the gay
students and their allies are valued insiders in the school
community and religious conservatives are despised outsiders,
"homophobes" whose sincerely held religious views concerning
marriage and human sexual morality are anathema to school
authorities? Do these dissenters have a liberty interest served by
the removal of the display?
As Justice Harlan put it so memorably in Cohen v. California,
the remedy for those who wish to avoid the "bombardment of
their sensibilities" by messages that offend them is "simply by
averting their eyes."2 ' This is true even in the case of
impressionable school children exposed in school to ideas and
messages they perceive as "distasteful or immoral or absurd," or
even "offensive and irreligious."22 As Justice Kennedy put it so
17. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 870-71.
19. Id. at 867-68.
20. Martin D. Munic, Education or Indoctrination-Removal of Books from Public School
Libraries: Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 68
MINN. L. REv. 213, 237 (1983).
21. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court explicitly stated that to
allow offended listeners a right to censor speech that offends them would create a kind of
heckler's veto by empowering the hecklers to censor speech "as a matter of personal
predilections." Id. The Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.
Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (noting that the Constitutional remedy for the "unwilling listener
or viewer" is to avert her eyes (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
210-11 (1975))).
22. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
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clearly in Lee v. Weisman: "To endure the speech of false ideas or
offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how
to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open
discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry. And tolerance
presupposes some mutuality of obligation."23 In other words, the
remedy for students offended by ideas they are exposed to in
public schools is not to censor the speech of their teachers and
fellow students, but rather to have "confidence in [their] own
ability to accept or reject [the] ideas" of others and to respond to
what they believe to be false ideas with their own version of the
truth. 4
In a tolerant and pluralistic society, all points of view should
be allowed to compete in the marketplace of ideas, and no one
has a liberty interest or right "to prevent criticism of [his] beliefs
or even [his] way of life." 5 The just-quoted language is from
Circuit Judge Posner's opinion for the court in Zamecnik v.
Indian Prairie School District No. 204, a case (like our hypothetical)
involving a public school and speech concerning
homosexuality.2 6 In Zamecnik, after the school allowed teachers
and students to wear T-shirts supporting gay pride as part of an
annual event called the "Day of Silence," it subsequently banned
students from taking the opposing side of the issue by wearing T-
shirts with the slogan "Be Happy, Not Gay."27 The school banned
the T-shirts under a school rule forbidding "derogatory
comments" concerning sexual orientation.28 The Seventh Circuit
ruled against the school and held that "a school that permits
advocacy of the rights of homosexual students cannot be allowed
to stifle criticism of homosexuality."2 Students offended by the
T-shirts' message do not have a heckler's veto to silence their
fellow students because, as Judge Posner put it, disapproval of
another's message "is not a permissible ground for banning it."30
In a pluralistic and democratic society, students must be
23. Id. at 590-91.
24. Id. at 591.
25. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 2011).
26. See id. at 875.
27. Id. Plaintiff Heidi Zamecnik wore the "Be Happy, Not Gay" T-shirt to school on
"Day of Truth," an annual event designed as a counterpoint to "Day of Silence." Id.
28. Id. "A school official inked out the phrase 'Not Gay'" on Plaintiffs T-shirt. Id.
29. Id. at 876.
30. Id. at 879. The Constitution does not "establish a generalized 'hurt feelings'
defense to a high school's violation of the First Amendment rights of its students." Id. at
877.
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prepared to think for themselves on controversial issues such as
gay rights, and thus, they should not be sheltered from the clash
of opposing views, even if some of those views are considered
derogatory or offensive by fellow students or school officials.31
Thus, in our hypothetical concerning the gay pride display, it
seems that the willing audience for the display has a strong
liberty interest in being protected against censorship of the
display, and that removal of the display does not advance any
serious liberty interest of the Christian students offended by the
display. In other words, the school board's decision to remove
the display in order to appease the offended families does not
advance anyone's liberty but, to the contrary, serves to constrain
the liberty of the display's willing audience to receive speech.
Moreover, even if we change the facts a little to strengthen the
claim of the Christian dissenters, there is still no liberty interest
served by censorship or removal of the display. Suppose, for
example, that school authorities required students to affirm their
belief and support for the display's message of gay pride and the
evil of "homophobia." Would the Christian students now have a
liberty interest in resisting the compelled affirmation of belief?
Under West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette, a public
school may not compel any student "to confess by word or act"
the student's allegiance to any "matter[] of opinion."32 Thus, the
Christian dissenters now have a liberty interest that protects
them from being compelled to affirm their allegiance to the
message of the gay pride display. However, under Barnette, a
student's right not to participate in recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance does not include a right to silence his teacher and
willing classmates who wish to participate. As Judge Easterbrook
explained in Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21,
"so long as the school does not compel pupils to espouse the
content of the Pledge as their own belief, it may carry on with
patriotic exercises. Objection by the few does not reduce to
silence the many who want to pledge allegiance."33 As in Barnette
31. See id. at 876.
32. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that under
the First Amendment, public schools may not compel students to pledge allegiance to the
flag).
33. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). For an excellent discussion of Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in this case, see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge ofAllegiance Problem, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 451 (1995).
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and Shennan, so too in our hypothetical. The Christian dissenters
may not be compelled to affirm their support for the gay pride
display, but so long as they are free to avert their eyes and ignore
the gay pride display, they have no liberty interest in denying
others the liberty to be an audience for the school's gay pride
display.
B. Why Heckler's Vetoes are Bad and Offended Observer's Vetoes are
Worse
What exactly is wrong with the government appeasing the hurt
feelings of those who are offended by speech in public places?
Why should the right to speak and to receive speech be elevated
over the rights of those who are deeply offended by expression
they encounter in public places?
The classic heckler's veto case arises when someone wishes to
speak in a public forum and someone else threatens to violently
stop the speech. So, for example, someone like Martin Luther
King may wish to speak in favor of racial equality in a public park
in Montgomery, Alabama, and someone else, perhaps a local
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, threatens violence if Dr. King is
allowed to speak. In order to keep the peace and prevent a
violent situation, city officials forbid Dr. King from speaking. Is it
wrong for government to silence a speaker in order to avert a
possible violent reaction? If so, why?"
Cheryl Leanza has explained the heckler's veto cases in this
manner:
Heckler's veto cases typically consider the appropriate behavior
of local law enforcement when a crowd or individual threatens
hostile action in response to a demonstration or speaker. In
these cases, the First Amendment grants a positive right to the
speaker: the local government must take action to protect the
speaker against a hostile crowd. The courts do not allow local
law enforcement to accede to a heckler's veto.15
In other words, the evil in heckler's veto situations is that it
34. In his important book on free speech and the civil rights movement in the South,
Harry KalvenJr., warned that without constitutional protection for the freedom of speech
of "Negro speakers" against hostile Southern crowds, the South could become "one
gigantic heckler veto." HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 141
(1966).
35. Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler's Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35
HOFSTRAL. REv. 1305, 1306 (2007).
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empowers hecklers to "silence any speaker of whom they do not
approve."3 6
It is not only the speaker who benefits from the law's rejection
of the heckler's veto; the willing audience for the speaker's
message is also protected. In other words, "difficult questions of
competing First Amendment rights should be resolved with the
goal of increasing the viewpoints to which listeners are
exposed."" Even if no speaker is harmed when the state accedes
to a heckler's veto, "first amendment recognition [should] be
given to a right of access for the protection of the reader, the
listener, and the viewer."3 8
Professor Barron believed the "point of ultimate interest" of
the First Amendment should be "not the words of the speakers
but the minds of the hearers."3 Thus, the point of free speech,
even from the perspective of speakers, is for the ideas in the
speaker's message to reach the minds of the willing audience.
When government accedes to a heckler's veto, the censored
ideas die aborning, and the marketplace of ideas is impoverished
accordingly.
Notice that the classic heckler's veto situation is different, in at
least one respect, from the offended-observer situation in Pico
and in our gay pride display hypothetical. 40 In the case of the
heckler's veto, the state's decision to censor expression is not
intended to suppress speech or to appease hecklers, but rather
to serve a strong interest in protecting public safety from a
potentially violent demonstration. However, in cases concerning
offended observers, the government curtails speech not to
36. KALVEN, supra note 34, at 140.
37. Leanza, supra note 35, at 1305.
38. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1641, 1666 (1967).
39. Id. at 1653.
40. 1 am using the term "offended-observer situation" to describe cases in which the
heckler is not threatening violence, but instead asks government officials to suppress
books or displays that offend his sensibilities. Professor Esbeck calls these cases
"unwanted exposure" cases. See Carl H. Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression by
Government: Standing and the Establishment Clause, 7 CHARLESTON L. REv. 607, 608 (2013)
[hereinafter Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression]. These are almost
uniformly cases in which the offended observer could easily have avoided the unwanted
expression simply by looking away or taking a slightly different path across the public
square. For example, in Pico, rather than seek to remove library books they disliked, the
offended observers could have avoided the books merely by declining to check them out
(or by instructing their children not to check them out). And in our gay pride
hypothetical, the offended observers could have simply averted their eyes as they
approached the gay pride display.
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protect public safety, but merely to appease the sensibilities of
those who have decided to seek to censor an unwanted display
rather than to avert their eyes.41 The government inflicts a real
First Amendment harm on the willing audience for the censored
expression for the sole purpose of empowering the offended
observers to decide which speech others may have the
opportunity to read or view in public space.
To pose yet another example of the offended observer's veto,
suppose a state art museum, under pressure from a group of
conservative citizens, decides to remove its collection of the late
Robert Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photography from public
viewing in the museum.4 1 Should the First Amendment protect
the interest of those who wish to view the Mapplethorpe exhibit,
or does it allow the state to censor the exhibit in order to
accommodate the offended sensibilities of those who wish to
"contract the spectrum" of art available for public viewing?43
Again, the willing audience for the Mapplethorpe exhibit has, at
the very least, a strong liberty interest in the recognition of its
right to view the photographs, especially when the state's only
reason for removing the exhibit is to censor ideas disliked by the
politically influential offended observers.
As DistrictJudge Tauro explained when he enjoined a school
committee's decision to remove a controversial book from a
public school library in response to complaints by offended
parents: "The most effective antidote to the poison of mindless
orthodoxy is ready access to a broad sweep of ideas and
philosophies. There is no danger in such exposure. The danger
is in mind control."44  The evil of heckler's vetoes, and of
41. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
42. See Nat'I Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998) (describing
political opposition to public support for the exhibition of Mapplethorpe's homoerotic
photography). See also Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1035
(N.D. Ind. 2001) (resulting in an unsuccessful attempt by offended observers to enjoin
theatrical production of Corpus Christi at a state university).
43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (stating that "the State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of
available knowledge"). Moreover, additional dictum injustice Douglas's majority opinion
in Griswold stated that the "right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the
right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and
freedom of inquiry, [and] freedom of thought . Id. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
44. Right To Read Def. Comm. v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. Ma. 1978).
As Nat Hentoff observed, "No judge in all of American history had ever before so clearly
and vigorously set forth the First Amendment right-to-read of public school students."
NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
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offended observer's vetoes, is for government to allow the
sensibilities of some citizens to deny "the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences. To put it another way, heckler's
vetoes deprive individuals who may "wish to form an opinion
rather than voice one" the opportunity "to sample widely from
books and cultural materials" that might help them "gather ideas
rather than advocate a position." 6
III. PASSIVE DISPLAYS AND LIBERTY: ANOTHER HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Suppose we introduce a slight change in the facts of our
hypothetical case involving censorship of the gay pride poster.
Suppose now a public school decides to display, not a gay pride
poster, but rather a "Merry Christmas" poster featuring a typical
portrayal of a young mother, a bearded father, and an infant
child in a manger. Next, several dissenting students and their
families demand that the school must take this poster down to
comply with the Establishment Clause. If a court were to agree
that this passive Christmas display violates the incorporated
Establishment Clause, would the court be advancing liberty or
constraining liberty?
Surely, the answer here must be the same as in our first
hypothetical. Liberty resides with the students who compose the
Christmas display's willing audience, not with those offended by
the display, since the latter individuals may avert their eyes if they
wish to avoid viewing it. Liberty is offended by heckler's vetoes,
and undoubtedly the First Amendment must not require
censorship to appease those offended by a Christmas display that
is meaningful to others. In a pluralistic society, the public culture
should reflect the diversity of our society, not the narrow views of
those who seek to deny others a place at the table.
Is this an unfair interpretation? Suppose instead of a
Christmas display a public school decides to celebrate Martin
Luther King Day with a poster of Dr. King and the quotation: "A
just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or
AMERICA 36-37 (1980).
45. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
46. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living-
Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive
Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 803 (2006).
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the law of God.""7 How should this case come out?
The Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving
passive governmental displays touching upon religion,48 and its
decisions are consistently inconsistent, seriously muddled, and
egregiously flawed.49  Many of these cases allow offended
observers to censor passive religious displays and thus deprive a
willing audience of the right to receive speech that previously
had been available to them.5 o
Since all of these cases concern state or local government
displays, they have been decided under the incorporated
Establishment Clause.51 In order to clearly focus on what the
Constitution says about this issue, it seems appropriate to begin
with the Court's jurisprudence concerning incorporation of the
Establishment Clause.
A. Incorporation as Protection Against Deprivations of Liberty
The Bill of Rights was originally ratified as a check on the
power of the federal government,52 and in Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, the Supreme Court held that these amendments were
not applicable to the states." Chief Justice Marshall explained
this holding in no uncertain terms:
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would
have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have
expressed that intention. Had congress engaged in the
47. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. 289, 293 (James M. Washington ed., 1991). Or, perhaps the poster might have quoted
from Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" speech, which he closed by quoting "the words of the
old Negro spiritual, 'Free at last, free at last; thank God Almighty, we are free at last.'"
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR., supra, at 217,220.
48. See infta notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry & John P. Garry, The Establishment Clause and the Making
of a New Secularism: A Review Essay on Church, State and the Crisis in American Secularism
by Bruce Ledewitz, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 251, 253 (2013) ("Because of very sharp and basic
differences between the justices, the United States Supreme Court has been inconsistent
and confusing in its Establishment Clause doctrine.").
50. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
52. This discussion of incorporation of the Establishment Clause relies heavily on my
earlier work. See Richard F. Duncan, justice Thomas and Partial Incorporation of the
Establishment Clause: Herein of Structural Limitations, Liberty Interests, and Taking Incorporation
Seriously, 20 REGENT U. L. REv. 37 (2007).
53. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
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extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the
several states, by affording the people additional protection
from the exercise of power by their own governments, in
matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have
declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.
... These amendments demanded security against the
apprehended encroachments of the general government
not against those of the local governments.
. .. These amendments contain no expression indicating an
intention to apply them to the state governments. This court
cannot so apply them."
However, by early in the twentieth century the Supreme Court
had found a way to "incorporate" certain provisions of the Bill of
Rights against the states as "part of the liberty protected from
state interference by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" Under this concept of "selective incorporation,"
a particular provision of the Bill of Rights "is made applicable to
the states if the Justices are of the opinion that it was meant to
protect a 'fundamental' aspect of liberty."5 6 In other words, only
individual liberties that are deemed to be "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"5 7 or "fundamental to the American
scheme of Justice"5 8 are incorporated against the states by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice
John Paul Stevens has put it so directly, "the idea of liberty" is the
source of the incorporation doctrine.5
Moreover, under the doctrine of incorporation these
fundamental individual liberties are protected only against
"deprivations" by the states. 0 Individuals do not have a right to
strike down laws that merely hurt their feelings or offend their
sensibilities because only laws that deprive them of a protected
liberty-i.e., laws which impose substantial burdens, undue
burdens, or extreme restrictions on their individual liberty-
constitute unconstitutional deprivations of liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the incorporated liberty of free
54. Id. at 250.
55. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.3.3, at
511 (4th ed. 2011).
56. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 4, § 15.6(a), at 855.
57. Id. at 855-56 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
58. Id. at 856 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
59. Stevens, supra note 4, at 33.
60. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the portal for
incorporation, provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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exercise of religion is protected, if at all, only against laws that
impose "substantial burdens" on an individual's religious
exercise. 6' Similarly, freedom of speech protects an individual's
right to say what he wishes to say and to refrain from being
compelled to speak, not the right to censor the state's message
or to silence willing messengers of the government's speech.62
The right to just compensation for regulatory takings is
protected only against "extreme"63 regulations that deprive an
owner of "economically viable use" of her property." Even a
woman's "fundamental liberty" to choose to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy is protected only against laws that unduly
burden her liberty to choose, not against laws that reasonably
regulate her access to abortion or which merely seek to persuade
her to give life to the child she is carrying.6"
Thus, under the Court's theory of incorporation, structural
provisions of the Constitution-i.e., those which define and limit
the powers of the national government-"resist incorporation," 66
because these provisions do not create fundamental individual
liberty interests. For example, no one would suggest that the
powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to
declare war67 should be incorporated and made applicable to the
61. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a government
scholarship that could be used by college students to pursue a degree in any course of
study except devotional theology imposed only a "relatively minor burden" on the free
exercise liberty of scholarship recipients and thus did not violate the incorporated Free
Exercise Clause). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
62. SeeW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 642 (1943). AsJudge
Easterbrook observed, although a student has a right under the incorporated Free
Speech Clause not to be compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in a government
school, she does not have a corresponding right to censor the curriculum or to silence
her classmates "who want to pledge allegiance." Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21,
980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
63. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S.
304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "only the most extreme regulations
can constitute takings").
64. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 499 (1987)
(holding that a regulation requiring 27 million tons of coal to be left in the ground to
protect surface structures from subsidence is not a taking because petitioners did not
prove "that they have been denied the economically viable use" of their overall coal
mining operations).
65. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (stating that
only "an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden").
66. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is a federalism
provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation.").
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 11.
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states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Further, a provision that
contains both a structural component and a liberty component is
properly subject only to partial incorporation; thus, only the
liberty component is capable of incorporation as a Fourteenth
Amendment "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause.69
When teaching cases interpreting the incorporated
Establishment Clause, I always begin the discussion by asking
students whether the law or policy being challenged deprives
anyone of any fundamental liberty interest. Then I ask whether
judicial invalidation of the law or policy would restrict anyone's
liberty? If you keep your eye on liberty interests in Establishment
Clause cases, rather than on a metaphor such as "the wall of
separation between church and state" or a judge-made test such
as the Lemon test or the endorsement test, you may see the real
issues and the real human interests in the case from a new and
startling perspective. Indeed, you may come to understand that
the Court often interprets the Establishment Clause to restrict
liberty, rather than to protect liberty.
B. Everson's Wall, The Lemon Test, O'Connor's Gloss, and The Naked
Public Square
Professor Bruce Ledowitz poses an interesting question: Is
America "a secular nation that tolerates religion [or] a religious
nation that tolerates nonbelief[?]" 0 Perhaps the correct answer
is neither of the above; perhaps America is best understood as a
pluralistic nation that celebrates the religious and ethnic
diversity of the various subgroups that have settled here. If this
third option is correct, then the public culture-and the
governmental symbols displayed in the public culture-should
reflect that diversity and pluralism.
1. Everson's Wall
"Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
68. See Luke Meier, Constitutional Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge of
Allegiance, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 162, 163-67 (2006).
69. Id.
70. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM 23
(2011).
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That wants it down."71
As Daniel Dreisbach points out, Frost's poem is actually a
debate between the poem's narrator, who views walls as limiting
the freedom of those who are "walled out," and the poem's
antagonist, who believes that "[g] ood fences make good
neighbors" and welcomes the protection from trespass that a
good wall provides to the owner of private property. Of course,
when the wall surrounds the public square, those who are
"walled out" may well take offense as they look over the wall from
the outside and see others who are welcomed inside.
The Supreme Court's modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence begins with Everson v. Board of Education.73 In
Everson, the Court applied the Establishment Clause against state
and local government for the first time.7 4 Although the Court
upheld a program that reimbursed parents for the cost of bus
transportation to any public or private school, including private
religious schools, Justice Black wrote a majority opinion that
called for a "high and impregnable"7 - wall of separation between
church and state:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
71. ROBERT FROST, MENDING WALL, repinted in COLLECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST
48 (1930).
72. DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 108-09 (2002).
73. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 18.
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"a wall of separation between Church and State."76
Justice Black made no attempt to describe which fundamental
individual liberty interest had been incorporated from the
Establishment Clause against the states, nor did he explain
whether Jefferson intended his metaphor of a wall of separation
to limit state and local laws touching upon religion." As
Professor Jim Lindgren recently wrote: "The phrase 'Separation
of Church and State' . . . is not in the language of the first
amendment, was not favored by any influential framer at the
time of the first amendment, and was not its purpose."7
Although the phrase was first used by Jefferson in private,
political correspondence to a group of his political supporters,
Jefferson meant the term to illustrate the "wall" between the
federal government and the state; he meant it as a wall that kept
the federal government from interfering-one way or the
other-with state laws respecting religious establishments.o 1In
other words, for Jefferson the wall protected federalism; it was a
compromise that allowed states like Virginia to disestablish
religion and states like Maryland to establish religion. The
autonomy of state governments in matters of religion was
protected against the federal government-against any federal
law respecting an establishment of religion. A federal law
establishing a national religion was forbidden, as was a federal
law outlawing state establishments of religion. Either would be
an example of Congress making a law respecting an
establishment of religion.81
76. Id. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,164 (1878)).
77. Id. at 3-18.
78. Jim Lindgren, How Separation of Church and State Was Read Into the Constitution
(Hint: The KKK Got Its Way), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 20, 2010, 3:38 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2010/10/20/how-separation-of-church-and-state-was-read-into-
the-constitution-hint-the-kkk-got-its-way/ [http://perma.cc/E8HM-W3YB].
79. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Nehemiah
Dodge et al., Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/
9806/danpre.html [http://perma.cc/8T33-GV8V].
80. As Professor Dreisbach explains, "A careful review of Jefferson's actions
throughout his public career suggests that he believed, as a matter of federalism, that the
national government had no jurisdiction in religious matters, whereas state governments
were authorized to accommodate and even prescribe religious exercises." DREISBACH,
supra note 72, at 59-60.
81. Id. at 67-71. "In short, the 'wall' Jefferson erected in the Danbury letter was
between the federal government on one side and church authorities and state
governments on the other." Id. at 68. Thus, Jefferson's "wall" protected state sovereignty
"on matters pertaining to religion, thereby preventing the federal regime from
interfering with religious establishments and practices endorsed by state governments."
Id. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 34
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If it was not Jefferson's "wall" that the Everson Court erected as
a defining metaphor for its strict separationist jurisprudence,
then whose wall was it? In his Everson opinion, Justice Black
neglected to mention his own remarkable personal history with
the wall motif and the Ku Klux Klan. 2
As Professor Philip Hamburger, a prominent legal historian
on the Establishment Clause, observes: "Leaping from Jefferson's
1802 letter to Hugo Black's Everson opinion in 1947, the modern
myth of separation omits any discussion of nativist sentiment in
America and, above all, omits any mention of the Ku Klux
Klan."83 Before joining the Court in 1937, Hugo Black was not
just an ordinary member, but rather held a leadership position
in the Invisible Empire of the Ku Klux Klan.84 Indeed, as Kladd
of his Klan Klavern, the soon-to-be-Justice Black was charged with
leading new members of the KKK in their recitation of the
Klansman's oath of allegiance which included allegiance to "free
public schools. . . separation of church and state ... [and] white
supremacy."8 5 Moreover, Klan members often recited something
called the "Klansman's Creed," which included a statement of
their belief "in the eternal Separation of Church and State."86
After documenting these historical facts, Professor
Hamburger provides interesting context to Justice Black's
separationist opinion in Everson: "Black had long before sworn,
under the light of flaming crosses, to preserve 'the sacred
constitutional rights' of 'free public schools' and 'separation of
church and state.' Subsequently, he had administered this oath
to thousands of others in similar ceremonies."" Now in Everson,
continues Hamburger, "Black had an opportunity to make
separation the unanimous standard of the Court."88 Moreover,
Black was able to use "the fig leaf ofJefferson's letter" to obscure
the naked truth that the Court was radically transforming the
(1998) ("The original establishment clause, on a close reading, is not antiestablishment
but pro-states' rights; it is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus
nonestablishment and simply calls for the issue to be decided locally.").
82. Everson, 330 U.S. 1; Lindgren, supra note 78.
83. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 399 (2002).
84. Id. at 422-26. "In September 1923 Black joined the powerful Richard E. Lee Klan
No. I and promptly became Kladd of his Klavern-the officer who initiated new
members." Id. at 426.
85. Id. at 409, 426.
86. Id. at 408.
87. Id. at 462.
88. Id. See also Lindgren, supra note 78.
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nature of "the First Amendment's religious liberty." 9
To return to Frost's poem, we might well ask exactly who was
intended to be "walled out" when Justice Black and the Everson
Court built a wall of separation? The answer is clear-Justice
Black's anti-Catholic views have been well-established, and as
Professor Hamburger puts it, "[h]olding such views ... Black in
1947 led the Court to declare itself in favor of the 'separation of
church and state."' 90
2. The Lemon Test and O'Connor's Gloss
Religious cleansing under the wall of separation had its high-
water mark in Lemon v. Kurtzman, an Establishment Clause
decision in which the Supreme Court struck down neutral state
educational funding programs subsidizing nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools.' As the Court itself acknowledged, these
programs funded both secular and religious private schools, and
were designed not to advance religion, but rather "to enhance
the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws."92 In other words, these laws were
designed to advance the liberty of parents to choose an
appropriate elementary and secondary education for their
children; no one was deprived of any fundamental liberty under
these programs.
However, without making any effort to identify an individual
liberty interest in need of protection under these programs, the
Court adopted the following strict separationist test for the
incorporated Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.""'
Again, notice that this three-part test is not based upon
individual liberty. Rather, it is a structural doctrine that defines
89. HAMBURGER, supra note 83, at 483.
90. Id. at 463. See also MARC 0. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
193 (2013) (noting that this "virulently anti-Catholic" animus of strict separation "served
as a cohesive political and cultural agent for an increasingly fragmented Protestant
majority").
91. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
92. Id. at 613.
93. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)).
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and limits the power of state and local governments.9 4 Under this
test, a law that lacks a "secular legislative purpose" will be
unconstitutional even if it deprives no one of even the slightest
liberty interest. The Lemon Court made clear that under its view
of the Establishment Clause "religion must be a private matter
for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice."95 Therefore, even a neutral and modest program
designed to help parents pay for the compulsory education of
their children outside the public schools must be struck down as
an unconstitutional establishment of religion if religious schools
are included within its scope.
The first two prongs of the Lemon test were "clarifie [d]"9 6 by
Justice O'Connor's judicial creation of the so-called
"endorsement test" or what one commentator calls the
"'symbolic endorsement' test."97 Under the endorsement test,
the Court must determine whether a particular government
display or expression "constitutes an endorsement or disapproval
of religion."9 8 The idea is that government must be "neutral in
matters of religion" so that neither religious believers nor
nonbelievers are sent a message from their government "that
they are outsiders or less than full members of the political
community."9
But when evaluating a public culture such as ours, in which
government endorses many things and celebrates many causes,100
94. See Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression, supra note 40, at 647.
Professor Esbeck observes that in many of the Court's Establishment Clause decisions no
one is harmed, coerced, or deprived of liberty; therefore, he concludes that the
incorporated Establishment Clause has been construed by the Court "to operate in many
respects like the structural clauses of the Constitution which separates the powers of the
three federal branches." Id. Of course, this contradicts the Court's own theory of
incorporation, which is based upon the idea that only individual fundamental liberties
protected against the national government by the Bill of Rights are incorporated against
deprivation by state and local government under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
95. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
96. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that her focus "on endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an
analytical device").
97. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 1237-38.
98. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
99. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
100. See KEVIN SEAMUS HASSON, THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG: ENDING THE CULTURE
WAR OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA 128 (2005) (observing that government "celebrates
everything from National Catfish Day to National Jukebox Week"). I would add that
government also celebrates many ethnic and cultural causes such as Cinco de Mayo, Gay
Pride Month, Black History Month, Earth Day, and Kwanzaa. A truly "neutral" public
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how are we to determine whether a Christmas nativity display in
a local park or public school endorses religion? Or whether the
removal of such a display by a federal court injunction endorses
a message of disapproval of religion? Why are citizens who
celebrate Christmas marked as favored insiders when the
Christmas display is only one of hundreds appearing in the
public square in the course of any given year? Indeed, when a
religious display is singled out and cleansed from a public square
open to all sorts of secular displays by a federal court applying
the endorsement test, doesn't this judicial decree tell the
religious display's willing audience that they are outsiders and
less than full members of the political community?
3. The Naked Public Square: The Endorsement Test as a
Heckler's Veto
The endorsement test has been used by the Court as a vehicle
for allowing offended observers, who have suffered no serious
deprivation of liberty, to impose heckler's vetoes on harmless
religious expression in the public culture. Under the
endorsement test, even a passive religious display erected by
government, as one small part of the public culture, will be
declared unconstitutional if the Court determines that either the
purpose or the effect of the display was endorsement or
disapproval of religion."o'
The "touchstone" of the endorsement test, according to the
Court, is "'governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion."'10 However, a
naked public square, open to an abundance of secular displays
but cleansed of all religious displays, may be neutral among
religions-all of which are excluded from public culture-but is
most certainly anything but neutral between religion and
culture in a pluralistic society should recognize and celebrate the full scope of its
diversity, not merely secular subgroups and secular ideas.
101. According to Justice O'Connor, the endorsement test is merely a way of
applying the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to
either question should render the challenged practice invalid.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
102. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
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nonreligion, between religious displays and nonreligious
displays. In a pluralistic society, a neutral public culture should
reflect not merely five hundred points of strictly secular light,
but rather a thousand points of both religious and secular light.
The naked public square does not reflect the pluralism and
diversity of the actual community, and therefore fails the
touchstone standard of neutrality. As Michael McConnell has put
it so efficiently: "Secularism is not neutrality."o3
When applying the endorsement test the Court discovers
harm where there is no harm by concluding that when
government displays a religious symbol, such as a Ten
Commandments monument or a nativity scene in a public
building or park, it somehow classifies citizens as either favored
or disfavored members of the political community. Justice
O'Connor has explained the harm caused by endorsement or
disapproval of religion as follows: "Endorsement sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." 104
In theory this sounds like neutrality; but in practice it allows
offended observers to censor religious displays from the public
square, and thus to deprive the willing audiences of their right to
view and enjoy these displays. Consider the following illustrative
cases.
a. The County of Allegheny Decision as a Heckler's Veto
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, the
Supreme Court considered whether a Christmas display located
on public property in Pittsburgh violated the incorporated
Establishment Clause.0 ' The challenged display was a nativity
scene depicting "the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm animals,
shepherds, and wise men, all placed in or before a wooden
representation of a manger, which has at its crest an angel
bearing a banner that proclaims 'Gloria in Excelsis Deo!"' 0 6 This
display was "placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny
103. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115,
163 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom].
104. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
105. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
106. Id. at 580.
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County Courthouse." 07 The Court applied the endorsement test
and held that the nativity scene was an unconstitutional
endorsement of "a patently Christian message: Glory to God for
the birth ofJesus Christ."0 8
But who was harmed by this passive recognition that Christmas
is a special season for many residents of Pittsburgh and
Allegheny County? Whose liberty was restricted by the mere
placement of this display on the staircase of a public building?
Justice O'Connor argued that the Christmas display was harmful
because it "convey[ed] a message to nonadherents of
Christianity that they are not full members of the political
community, and a corresponding message to Christians that they
are favored members of the political community." 09
But why should we think this is so? If we consider the
Christmas display, together with all the other displays and
expressions in the public culture of Pittsburgh over the course of
any given year, why is the message not merely one of inclusion
and recognition that the community is composed of many
equally valued subgroups who celebrate many different holidays
and ideas? For example, if Pittsburgh were to display a poster
celebrating Cinco de Mayo in the Grand Staircase of the
courthouse would Justice O'Connor perceive this as endorsing a
message that Latinos were favored members of the political
community and non-Latinos were of second-class status in the
community? When a public school celebrates Black History
Month, should Asians or Latinos view the celebration as sending
a message of favored and disfavored racial or ethnic status? Does
a Gay Pride poster in a public school send a message of favored
and disfavored membership in the political community? Or
should all of these passive displays be viewed as government
merely recognizing that it represents a pluralistic society, one
composed of many equally-valued subgroups. There is nothing
wrong or harmful when government creates a public culture that
recognizes the rich religious, ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity
of the community it represents.
Indeed, it might be more reasonable to view the religious
cleansing of Pittsburgh's public culture pursuant to the Court's
107. Id. at 578.
108. Id. at 601.
109. Id. at 626 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
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decree in County of Allegheny as endorsing a message of
disapproval of religion. Certainly Justice Kennedy interpreted
the Court's strict separationist view of the Establishment Clause
as reflecting "an unjustified hostility toward religion."110 As Kevin
Seamus Hasson observes, if religious displays are cleansed from a
public culture open to a vast multitude of nonreligious displays,
the resulting message is not one that is neutral toward religion:
It's impossible for the government to be silent on religion in
culture because its silence itself speaks volumes. If the
government were uninvolved in our culture generally, there
would be no problem with it being uninvolved in our religious
expression. But it's not uninvolved at all. The government is a
major force in the culture. It celebrates everything from
National Catfish Day to National Jukebox Week. It proclaims
national holidays to commemorate a wide variety of things,
from Thanksgiving to Memorial Day to Martin Luther King
Day. It runs a comprehensive public school system that
purports to teach children what they need to know about
everything from literature to sex. It provides public universities
that not only educate in the arts, but are a major venue for
their performance and display, as well as a formidable
intellectual force in the debate about them. And the
government's reach extends even further. It actually
underwrites the arts of its choosing. Taken together, the
government-run educational system, its subsidy of the arts, its
proclamation of holidays all combine to create a cultural force
of seismic proportions.I
Moreover, as Steven Smith notes, "alienation produced by
Supreme Court decisions may be even more severe than
alienation provoked by actions of legislatures or lower
government officials.""' This is so because when the Supreme
Court cleanses religion from the public culture in the name of
the Constitution, it sends a message to people of faith that "their
central beliefs and values are incompatible with the fundamental
and enduring principles upon which the Republic rests.""'
It seems clear that if the Court were truly concerned about
religious liberty under the incorporated Establishment Clause, it
would not allow offended observers the right to censor this
110. Id. at 655 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. HASSON, supra note 100, at 128.
112. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 266, 311 (1987).
113. Id.
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harmless, passive nativity display from the public square. In
County of Allegheny, the Court applied the Establishment Clause
not to advance anyone's religious liberty, but rather to grant one
group of citizens the power to deprive another group of citizens
an opportunity to view and enjoy the nativity display.114 In other
words, as Justice Kennedy correctly observed, the Court in County
of Allegheny actually created a heckler's veto pursuant to which
the Court, at the request of offended observers, acted "as a
censor, issuing national decrees as to what is orthodox and what
is not." 15
b. Silence is Verboten: Wallace v. Jaffree as a Heckler's Veto
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the State of Alabama enacted a law
requiring public school teachers to begin each day by
announcing "that a period of silence not to exceed one minute
in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary
prayer."" 6 This law did not in any way restrict the religious
liberty of any person. No one was required to pray and each
student was free to think or reflect on any subject or none at
all. 17 Each student was free to pray, or meditate, or reflect on his
Little League batting average, or worry about whether the Social
Security system would remain solvent for her generation of
future retirees."' The law was completely harmless and should
have been of no concern to a judiciary charged with protecting
fundamental liberties from deprivation by the states.
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court struck down this benign
law under the incorporated Establishment Clause because it was
enacted with "[t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the
public schools."" 9 Although the Court stated that its job was to
vindicate "the individual freedoms protected by the First
Amendment" against deprivation by "the several states,"2 0 the
Court's exclusive concern was not on individual freedom, but
114. As Justice Kennedy emphasized, Pittsburgh's nativity display was merely a passive
symbol and offended observers were free to "ignore" it, to avert their eyes from it, "or
even to turn their backs" to it. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662, 664 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 678.
116. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 n.2
(1985).
117. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1.
118. See id.
119. Jafftee, 472 U.S. at 59.
120. Id. at 48-49.
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whether the Alabama legislature enacted the moment of silence
law in pursuit of "a clearly secular purpose."' 2 ' Relying primarily
on a statement by Senator David Holmes, the sponsor of the
moment-of-silence bill in the state senate, that the law was an
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools,"' 22 the
Court held that the law "was intended to convey a message of
state approval of prayer activities in the public schools"'23 and as
such was an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the
Lemon test and the endorsement test. 124
However, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his dissent,
even if the statements of one state senator are sufficient to
establish the legislative purpose of a particular state law, Senator
Holmes's statements establish that the law was intended not
simply to return prayer to the public schools, but importantly "to
clear up a widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild is
legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual prayer once
he steps inside a public school building."' 25 In other words, the
law was designed to protect religious liberty in public schools by
making clear that each child has a constitutional right to pray
silently in school, and to provide all students an opportunity
each day to exercise their right to silently meditate, pray,
ponder, or think as they wish. As Justice Thomas has said in
another Establishment Clause decision, "[w]hen rights are
incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment they should advance, not constrain, individual
liberty." 126
As in County of Allegheny, the Court in Jaffree believed it was
acting to protect nonadherents of prayer from a state-endorsed
message that prayer "is favored or preferred." '2 But also, as in
County of Allegheny, the Court's decision in Jaffree delegated to
nonadherents-whose liberty to pray or not to pray was in no
way restricted, burdened or deprived under the law-the power
to enjoin the moment-of-silence law and thus to deny students
who wished to pray a brief opportunity to do so. This amounts to
a Court-ordered heckler's veto over the voluntary prayer of
121. Id. at 56.
122. Id. at 57 n.43 (emphasis omitted).
123. Id. at 61.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
126. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas,J., concurring).
127. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
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others and, moreover, as Chief Justice Burger observed, reflects
not neutrality but rather "'a brooding and pervasive dedication
to the secular"' and an "'active .. . hostility to the religious.""'28
c. When Insiders Are Outsiders and Outsiders Are Insiders: Cobb v.
Selman County School District as a Heckler's Veto
In County of Allegheny, Justice Kennedy criticized the
endorsement test as "flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable
in practice."'29 It is a subjective and indeterminate test, "an
incoherent mess" that can be used to reach any result you
wish.1 s0 Interestingly, a recent empirical study of Establishment
Clause decisions in federal courts concluded that "the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence invites even the
most conscientious of judges to draw deeply on personal
reactions to religious symbols and political attitudes about
religious influence on public institutions or policies. Sadly, the
Court's Establishment Clause doctrine has become an attractive
nuisance for political judging."' 31
Perhaps there is no better example of the ambiguous and
subjective nature of the endorsement test than Selman v. Cobb
County School District, a case in which a federal district judge
considered the constitutionality of a local school board's attempt
to deal with the coverage of evolution in public school science
classes.' 2 The facts of the case are simple: Cobb County school
officials adopted a policy designed to "strengthen evolution
128. Id. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg,J., concurring)).
129. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
130. Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 1, 4
(2006) ("One of the few things constitutional scholars of every stripe seem to agree about
is the proposition that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent
mess."). See also Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chi., 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (stating that under the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, "ajudge can do little but announce his gestalt").
131. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology "All The Way Down"? An Empirical Study
of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1263 (2012).
This study demonstrated that the most important variable in predicting the outcome of
Establishment Clause decisions in the lower federal courts was whether the judge was
appointed by a Democratic president or a Republican president. Id. at 1204-05. The
authors further concluded that "the subjectivity of Establishment Clause doctrine has
passed the point of tolerability" and, as a result, "the door to unrestrained political
judging has been thrown wide open." Id. at 1207.
132. Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005), vacated,
449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
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instruction""' in the schools and, in pursuit of this goal, adopted
a science textbook that provided "a comprehensive perspective
of current scientific thinking regarding theory of origins."'3 4
When some parents expressed concern about this, the school
board responded to these complaints by requiring a Sticker that
reads as follows to be placed in the science textbooks: "This
textbook contains material on evolution. Evolution is a theory,
not a fact, regarding the origin of living things. This material
should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and
critically considered."' 3 5
Of course, other parents objected to the Sticker. One such
offended observer opined that she was alarmed because she "felt
that the Sticker 'came from a religious source' because, in her
opinion, religious people are the only people who ever challenge
evolution."136 Some of these offended observers sued in federal
district court to challenge the Sticker's constitutionality under
the incorporated Establishment Clause.'3 1
District Judge Cooper applied the endorsement test to the
Sticker and found that it served two clear secular purposes:
First, the Sticker fosters critical thinking by encouraging
students to learn about evolution and to make their own
assessment regarding its merit. Second, by presenting evolution
in a manner that is not unnecessarily hostile, the Sticker
reduces offense to students and parents whose beliefs may
conflict with the teaching of evolution. 3 8
He thus concluded the Sticker satisfied the purpose prong of
the Lemon/endorsement test and went on to consider "whether
the statement at issue in fact conveys a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion to an informed, reasonable
observer." 39
Astonishingly, Judge Cooper decided that a "reasonable
observer would interpret the Sticker to convey a message of
endorsement of religion," 4 and explained his conclusion as
follows:
133. Id. at 1290.
134. Id. at 1291.
135. Id. at 1292.
136. Id. at 1297.
137. Id. at 1288.
138. Id. at 1305.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1306.
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That is, the Sticker sends a message to those who oppose
evolution for religious reasons that they are favored members
of the political community, while the Sticker sends a message
to those who believe in evolution that they are political
outsiders. This is particularly so in a case such as this one
involving impressionable public school students who are likely
to view the message on the Sticker as a union of church and
state. 141
In other words, the "political outsiders" are those whose views
are comprehensively taught inside the textbook and the
"favored" political insiders are those who get only the Sticker.
Even an impressionable child knows that the real insiders are
those who get the cake and the real outsiders are those who are
allowed only to lick the crumbs off the table. The Sticker was a
consolation prize designed to assure the real outsiders that the
school's decision to strengthen its teaching of evolution was "not
unnecessarily hostile" to parents whose religious beliefs
contradict what their children are being taught in the public
school classroom.' 2 This message does not endorse religion, but
rather religious tolerance and respect for "students and parents
whose beliefs may conflict with the teaching of evolution."143
The Sticker did not deprive any parent or any child of any
liberty protected by the First Amendment. However, by
censoring the Sticker to appease the offended observers, Judge
Cooper sent a clear message to those whose religious beliefs
deny human evolution that they are entitled neither to the cake
nor the crumbs. This is a court-ordered heckler's veto that
denies the Sticker's willing audience access to a message
designed, not to endorse their religion, but rather to assure
them that no disrespect was intended by the school board's
curricular decisions. The incorporated Establishment Clause was
employed by the court in Selman not to advance but rather to
restrict liberty. In a tolerant and pluralistic society, this case
should come out the other way.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1305.
143. Id.
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IV. PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS AND DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY: A
SUGGESTED APPROACH
A. The Lemon Test vs. Liberty Test
The Lemon/endorsement test is indeed a subjective,
inconsistent, and incoherent mess of a way to evaluate the
constitutionality of passive religious displays in the public
square. 144 As Professor Steven Gey points out, when applying the
endorsement test, the Supreme Court has "ruled that some
officially sanctioned Christmas displays were permissible, while
others were not."14 5 Remarkably, if a nativity display includes
secular objects, such as reindeer, a dancing elephant, and a
talking wishing well, it will likely pass muster under the
endorsement test;146 however, if the nativity scene does not
include such objects, it will likely fail the test.'4 1 Moreover, in two
recent Supreme Court decisions, "a majority of the Court held
that official displays of the Ten Commandments both were and
were not constitutional." 48
One can only guess how the Court would decide the
constitutionality of the proposed Holocaust memorial at the
Ohio statehouse which is planned to "feature two walkways
leading to a set of 18-foot panels that meet and form a cutout in
the shape of the six-point star, a symbol closely associated with
Judaism.""'4  The Freedom From Religion Foundation, a strict
separationist organization, challenged the Ohio Holocaust
memorial because "the Star of David is a religious symbol and a
secular government is not supposed to be promoting religion."150
Sez who?' 5 ' The Constitution? Certainly not the written
144. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
145. Gey, supra note 130, at 5.
146. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
147. SeeCnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1984).
148. Gey, supra note 130, at 5 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(upholding a Ten Commandments display in the area surrounding the Texas State
Capitol) and McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that Ten
Commandments displayed in county courthouse violated the purpose prong of the
Lemon/endorsement test)).
149. Katherine Bindley, Ohio Statehouse Holocaust Memorial Star of David Design




151. See Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1229, 1230
(referring to "'the grand sez who'" which is the universal skeptical response to the
authority of a person to assert a binding and unquestionable "normative proposition").
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Constitution.152 Justice Black and his associates in the Ku Klux
Klan? Justice O'Connor? The Freedom From Religion
Foundation? Sez who? Indeed, was there ever a time in American
history when the Lemon test and the endorsement test, if
submitted to the states as a proposed amendment to the written
Constitution, could have been ratified by three-fourths of the
several states as required by Article V?15
152. Consider this honest assessment of the Establishment Clause by a leading First
Amendment scholar, Professor Kent Greenawalt:
The most plausible reading of the original Establishment Clause-based on its
text, the history leading up to its enactment, and legislation enacted by
Congress-is that Congress could not establish a national religion, could not
enhance or interfere with state establishments, and could not establish religion
within exclusively federal domains. A purely "jurisdictional" reading that
Congress could have established religion within federal domains is mistaken.
Actions by the First Congress under the Constitution do, however, suggest that
its members did not have an expansive view of what measures were "respecting
an establishment of religion."
Because any jurisdictional aspect of the Establishment Clause that protected
state establishments had vastly diminished in significance by the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that clause, as well as the Free Exercise Clause, has
sensibly been incorporated against the states-assuming that incorporation of
other clauses of the Bill of Rights is appropriate. The modern Supreme Court's
treatment of the scope of the religion clauses cannot be justified on originalist
grounds, whether one concentrates on the original understanding of
forbidden practices at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights or the
original understanding of forbidden practices when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, but the latitude with which the Supreme Court has
departed from these original understandings is no greater than it has exhibited
with other parts of the First Amendment and with other guarantees in the Bill
of Rights. Whatever bases one may have to criticize the Supreme Court's
religion clause jurisprudence, it is not distinctly unfaithful to original
understandings.
2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 38-39 (Princeton Univ. Press
2008). In other words, because the Court has been unfaithful to other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, we should overlook its unfaithfulness when interpreting the incorporated
Establishment Clause. I appreciate Professor Greenawalt's candor, but I cannot concur
with his conclusion. See also McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 103, at 154 (" [T~he
endorsement test has no support in the history of the Religion Clauses.").
153. U.S. CONST. art. V. The Court's strict separationism has never been popular with
the American public. For example, a Fox News poll conducted in December of 2005
found that most Americans disagree with many of the Supreme Court's modern
Establishment Clause decisions:
The new poll finds that almost eight in 10 Americans (77 percent) believe the
courts have overreached in driving religion out of public life, and a 59 percent
majority feels Christianity is under attack.
Majorities of Republicans (89 percent), Democrats (73 percent) and
independents (69 percent) think the courts have gone too far in taking
religion out of public life.
Overall, most Americans disagree with several Supreme Court rulings on the
separation of church and state. For example, an overwhelming 87 percent
favor allowing public schools to set aside time for a moment of silence, and 82
percent favor allowing voluntary prayer. Another 82 percent favor allowing
public schools to have a prayer at graduation ceremonies, and 83 percent think
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The problem with the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and
similar separationist views of the Establishment Clause, and their
impact on passive, state-sanctioned displays touching upon
religion, is an almost complete failure to focus on the issue of
deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
the Court's own theory of incorporation, the Establishment
Clause is supposedly incorporated only against state and local
deprivations of individual liberty amounting to religious
establishment. 15 4 However, the Lemon/endorsement test is often
employed, not to advance liberty, but rather to give offended
observers a kind of court-ordered heckler's veto over the liberty
of others, over the right of a willing audience to view a Nativity
display, or a Ten Commandments display, or a Holocaust
memorial depicting a Star of David. In other words, the Court
has armed opponents of religious displays-opponents who
suffer no deprivation of liberty, because they could easily avoid
the unwelcome display merely by averting their eyes-"with an
invincible weapon: their mere opposition [becomes] a basis for a
finding of unconstitutionality."15'
Rather than the Lemon/endorsement test, or any similar
separationist structural test, the Court should analyze
Establishment Clause litigation involving passive, state-
sanctioned religious displays by asking three questions. First, has
the religious display under attack deprived anyone of any liberty
interest under the incorporated Establishment Clause? Second,
would enjoining the display amount to a heckler's veto allowing
one group of citizens the power to censor what another group of
citizens-the willing audience for the display-is allowed to see?
Third, would enjoining the display make the public square more
nativity scenes should be allowed on public property.
Not only do three-quarters of Americans (76 percent) think posting the Ten
Commandments on government property should be legal, but also two-thirds
(66 percent) say it is a good idea to post the commandments in public schools.
Dana Blanton, 12/01/05 FOX Poll: Courts Driving Religion Out of Public Life;
Christianity Under Attack, FOxNEWS.COM (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/
story/2 0 0 5/1 2 /01/120105-fox-poll-courts-driving-religion-out-public-life-christianity-
under/ [http://perma.cc/6KR4-QFV8]. Fox News is not alone in this finding. A survey
conducted by the First Amendment Center found that "[n]early two-thirds of the public
(65%) agree that 'teachers or other public school officials should be allowed to lead
prayers in school."' The First Amendment in Public Schools: A Comprehensive Survey of How
Administrators and Teachers View the Rights and Responsibilities of the First
Amendment, FREEDOMFORUM.ORG (Mar. 1, 2001), http://www.freedomforum.org/
templates/document.asp?documentlD=13390 [http://perma.cc/9992-CSCP].
154. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
155. McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 103, at 130.
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or less neutral; to put it differently, would the injunction result
in a public square that reflects the religious pluralism and
cultural diversity of the local community, or would it result in a
strictly secular public square that is a poor reflection of the local
community?
Under this approach, a nativity display in a public park, with
or without reindeer and talking wishing wells, would almost
certainly be constitutional under the test of liberty and
pluralism. Such a harmless, passive display does not deprive
anyone of any realistic liberty interest. Offended observers are
not required to worship the display or even to look at it. They
can easily avoid it, either by averting their eyes or by altering
their path by a few steps away from the site of the display.
The nativity display is best understood as neither a state-
sanctioned assertion of the truth of "the Christian belief in the
Incarnation,"s15  nor as a state-sanctioned secularization of the
Incarnation."' Rather, it is best understood as simply an
acknowledgement by the state that one of many valued
subgroups in the community is celebrating a religious holiday. In
other words, by displaying the nativity scene, the state is not
asserting the truth of Christianity but is merely recognizing that
some valued citizens are celebrating what they believe to be a
supernatural miracle and a religious truth."'
Moreover, since the display is only one of many state-
sanctioned messages in the public culture, it should not be
perceived as classifying citizens as insiders and outsiders. Rather,
it sends a message of inclusion, not exclusion, by reflecting the
idea that there are no outsiders in the political community, only
many different groups of valued insiders. Indeed, if offended
observers are allowed to cleanse religious displays from the
public culture, the message to religious subgroups in the
community is one of secular triumphalism, not neutrality and
pluralism. As Michael McConnell has observed:
If the aspects of culture controlled by the government (public
156. Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent
Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1211, 1213 (2011).
Professor Laycock asserts that the only serious interpretation of a nativity display is that it
represents a governmental statement "that Christianity is true." Id. at 1211, 1213.
157. See id. at 1212.
158. There is an important difference between the state recognizing a religious truth
and the state merely acknowledging that there are those in the community who are
celebrating what they believe to be a religious truth.
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spaces, public institutions) exactly mirrored the culture as a
whole, then the influence and effect of government
involvement would be nil: the religious life of the people would
be precisely the way it would be if the government were absent
from the cultural sphere. In a pluralistic culture, this is the best
of the possible understandings of "neutrality," since it will lead
to a broadly inclusive public sphere, in which the public is
presented a wide variety of perspectives, religious ones
included. If a city displays many different cultural symbols
during the course of the year, a nativity scene at Christmas or a
menorah at Hannukah is likely to be perceived as an
expression of pluralism rather than as an exercise in Christian
orJewish triumphalism.15 9
Such a result is also faithful to the Court's own theory of
incorporation of the Bill of Rights,160 because it takes the
question of deprivations of liberty seriously and does not allow
the Establishment Clause to be used by one group of citizens to
deny a First Amendment liberty to another group of citizens in
the name of an extra-constitutional principle, i.e. strict
separation of church and state. Our nation is neither a Christian
nation nor a secular nation; it is a pluralistic nation comprising a
rich stew of valued subgroups of citizens of all religions, ethnic
origins, and ideological perspectives. Rather than a religiously
naked public culture, the public square should be clothed in a
coat of many colors representing the rich heterogeneity of the
local community.
But what about the hypothetical involving a public school that
displays a "Merry Christmas" poster portraying a nativity scene?
How does the public school setting of this case differentiate it
from the nativity scene in a public park just analyzed above?
In the public school setting, the offended observers are young
and impressionable children attending public school in
satisfaction of mandatory attendance laws. Some would argue
that such impressionable children need more protection from
state-sanctioned religious displays because they are more likely to
feel coercive pressure to embrace school-sponsored religious
messages.' 6'
159. McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 103, at 193.
160. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) ("[T]here are heightened
concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools.").
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Of course, the "impressionable children" argument cuts both
ways because the willing audience for the nativity display is also
composed of impressionable children who, if religious displays
are extirpated from a public school culture open to all sorts of
secular displays, might well feel pressure to believe that only
secular causes are true and worthy of recognition. If the nativity
display might cause offended observers to feel like political
outsiders, how much more so will religious children feel like
political outsiders when the only displays cleansed from the
public school culture are the ones that most make them feel
equally regarded and welcome? As Justice Thomas observed in
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, when taking account of
the impressionable "minds of schoolchildren ... we cannot say
the danger that children would misperceive the endorsement of
religion is any greater than the danger that they would perceive a
hostility toward the religious viewpoint" if only religious displays
are banned from the public school culture. 162
The issue under the incorporated Establishment Clause
should be whether the circumstances of the nativity display
deprived students of any liberty interest by imposing "subtle
coercive pressure"163 to celebrate Christmas as a religious
holiday. In other words, does the nativity display amount to "an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a
religious orthodoxy,"1 4 or is it merely one of many school
displays designed to reflect the pluralism of the student body?
The concern should be whether the religious display operates
"to indoctrinate and coerce" 65 students into embracing a
religious truth.
Context matters in the search for deprivations of liberty.
There is a crucial distinction between a permanent copy of the
Ten Commandments required by state law to be displayed "on a
wall in each public elementary and secondary school
classroom"l 66 and a seasonal Christmas or Hannukah display put
162. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001).
163. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. In Lee, the Court stressed that a school-sponsored
commencement prayer placed coercive pressure on dissenting students to participate or
approve of "the rabbi's prayer." Id. at 593.
164. Id. at 592.
165. Id.
166. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39 n.1 (1980). Stone is a per curiam opinion that
struck down the state statute under the Lernon test because it had "no secular legislative
purpose." Id. at 41.
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up in the hallways to reflect that religious holidays are only one
of many occasions acknowledged on the walls of the public
school. It should be quite easy for a dissenting student to avoid
these temporary, passive displays by averting her eyes or taking a
few steps out of her way.
Thus, the holding in Stone, striking down a state law
mandating permanent display of the Ten Commandments in all
public school classrooms, would not have to be overruled to
uphold a passive, temporary nativity or menorah display in a
particular public school. A state statute mandating the
permanent display of the Ten Commandments in each and every
classroom in the public schools is much more likely to
"indoctrinate and coerce" 61 than are temporary, passive displays
designed merely to acknowledge that religious subgroups are
celebrating events that are of great significance to them. In the
absence of any real deprivation of liberty, the incorporated
Establishment Clause should not empower offended students to
impose a heckler's veto over what other students may see and
enjoy.
B. Standing or Substance?
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's "cases
involving unwanted exposure to religious symbols ...
attributable to the government" are actually "reduced-rigor
standing" decisions'68 that allow plaintiffs to sue under the
Establishment Clause even though they lack "the individualized
injury [normally] required for standing."16 This is so, observes
Professor Esbeck, because the Court has incorporated the
Establishment Clause as a structural limitation on state power
concerning matters relating to religion.' Thus, says Esbeck,
"[a]n individual claimant need not show religious harm or
personalized injury to win a claim under the Establishment
Clause.""' In other words, the Court's jurisprudence under the
167. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
168. Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression, supra note 40, at 644.
169. Id. at 648.
170. Id. at 647. See also Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint
on Governmental Power, 84 IowA L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause].
171. Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression, supra note 40, at 646. In other
words, "the Supreme Court has allowed reduced-rigor standing so as to ease the path to
reaching the merits." Id. at 644.
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incorporated Establishment Clause protects an imaginary injury
from a nonexistent deprivation.
This is an accurate perception of what the Court has done
under its Lemon/endorsement test, which is precisely my point.
Under the Court's own theory of incorporation under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, states should be
deemed to act unconstitutionally only when they deprive
someone of a fundamental individual liberty. Literally, the rule
of the incorporation doctrine is no harm, no foul."' Thus, when
an offended observer can avoid a religious display merely by
averting her eyes or walking a few steps out of her way, there is
no deprivation of liberty triggering rights under the
incorporated Establishment Clause.
If the Court is to honor its own theory of incorporation by
liberty, it should protect offended observers from religious
displays only when the display somehow deprives them of an
actual liberty interest. In other words, only substantial burdens
on Establishment Clause liberties should trigger a substantive
claim under the incorporated Establishment Clause. Since rights
under the incorporated Establishment Clause do not arise until a
substantial burden on liberty has been established, slight
burdens on liberty will not suffice. If offended observers can
easily avoid the challenged religious display, the Establishment
Clause will not be implicated. Such a requirement will add to the
sum total of liberty because it will prevent courts from wielding
the Lemon/endorsement test as a censor's sword. Thus, the
liberty of one group to view the display will not be sacrificed
unless the display somehow imposes a substantial burden on the
liberty of someone else. Liberty is a precious coin, and courts
should not be too quick to spend it to purchase a heckler's veto.
C. "Play in the Joints" and Federalism
Although one could argue that Pico and the Free Speech
Clause protect audiences when government acts to censor
passive religious displays merely to appease offended
observers, 73 this area strikes me more as one that cries out for
the Court to create room for "play in the joints" between what
the Establishment Clause forbids and what the Free Speech
172. See supra Part I.A.
173. See supra Part II.
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Clause protects.'14 At the very next opportunity-in a case
involving offended observers who have suffered no real
deprivation of liberty because they could have easily avoided a
state-sanctioned, passive religious display-the Court should
hold that the Constitution simply does not control the case. That
is, state and local officials are free to act either way. They may
remove the state-sanctioned religious display without violating
the Free Speech Clause if they wish to accommodate the
offended observers or they may allow the religious display to
remain in place without violating the Establishment Clause if
they wish to accommodate the willing audience of the display by
creating a truly pluralistic public culture.
As Professor Gey explains, under the play-in-the-joints
doctrine "the Supreme Court steps aside" and allows these
matters to be decided at the local level.175 "In some states," he
continues, "the separationists will win the political battle; in
other states the religious groups will prevail. Either way, the
Constitution is satisfied."176 Professor Gey thinks this is bad
because he supports what he calls a "separationist mandate
[which states] that limitations on government religious activity
are largely a matter of national, rather than local concern."7 7
However, there is no reason to think that the incorporated
Establishment Clause has turned the sovereign states into
impotent, "Hunger Games"-like vassal districts, without power
even to decide which passive symbols to display in the local
public square.178
Even if we accept that a clause designed to protect federalism
174. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004) (stating that the State of
Washington was free to either include or exclude devotional theology majors from a
state-funded college scholarship program because there is "'room for play in the joints"'
for "state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free
Exercise Clause" (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (upholding federal law providing special protection
for religious freedom of prison inmates because play in the joints creates space in which
government may "accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without
offense to the Establishment Clause").
175. Gey, supra note 130, at 35.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 10.
178. See SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES (Scholastic Press 2008). The Hunger
Games series is a trilogy of science fiction novels set in a future America "ruled by a
tyrannical central government (the 'Capitol') that oppresses and exploits twelve
subordinate districts." Ilya Somin, The Politics of The Hunger Games, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 17, 2012, 7:14 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/17/the-politics-
of-the-hunger-games/ [http://perma.cc/QQV3-AZFDI.
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and state autonomy could somehow be incorporated against the
states as an individual "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' there remains a
federalism component in the Establishment Clause. To the
extent that a state-sanctioned, passive religious display does not
deprive anyone of any real liberty interest, the Establishment
Clause leaves the issue to be determined at the state and local
level as one of the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. 80 There is no reason to think that only the federal
judiciary has the wisdom to decide which passive symbols are
appropriate and which are inappropriate for display in each and
every public park, building, and school in America. Indeed,
rather than act like a National Board of Interior Decorators'18
deciding how many plastic reindeer are necessary to make a
nativity display acceptable under the Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court should step aside and allow local officials to
decide how to decorate public buildings.
State and local public officials are eminently capable of
deciding which holidays and events to recognize in local public
schools, parks, and buildings. Moreover, if the people of the
179. See supra Part III.A. See also AMAR, supra note 81, at 34 ("The original
establishment clause, on a close reading, is not antiestablishment but pro-states'
rights .... ); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18 (1995) (noting that the Religion
Clause is "simply an assignment ofjurisdiction over matters of religion to the states-no
more, no less"). For an excellent and recent reappraisal of the 'jurisdictional"
understanding of the Establishment Clause, see Steven D. Smith, The jurisdictional
Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 (2006). As Professor
Esbeck puts it so well, when incorporating the Establishment Clause in Everson, "the
Court had to strain in order to squeeze a structural clause into a 'liberty' mold." Esbeck,
The Establishment Clause, supra note 170, at 27. Professor Esbeck also observes that
" [i]gnoring federalism in the Clause was an act of sheer judicial will" by the Court. Id. at
26.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."). As Madison put it in The Federalist 45, the power of the National
Government is limited to a "few and defined" areas "exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce," whereas "[t]he powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Public schools, public parks, and public
buildings are local matters at the core of the Tenth Amendment's reserved powers of the
states.
181. See Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chi., 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence requires judges to engage in work "more commonly associated with
interior decorators than with the judiciary").
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several states believe that constitutional law should govern the
display of state-sanctioned religious symbols in the public square,
they can look to their state constitutions to work out the
appropriate balance of interests. Finally, if local officials
somehow employ religious displays in a way that substantially
deprives offended observers of an actual liberty interest, perhaps
by placing coercive pressure on impressionable schoolchildren
to embrace a religious truth, the incorporated Establishment
Clause will be available to protect liberty against such
deprivations. This is how federalism was designed to allocate
power between the national government and local government,
and I believe it is the best approach to the issue of religious
symbols in the local public square.
D. Redundant or Complementary?
Some critics argue that if the Court interprets the
incorporated Establishment Clause as triggered only by some
substantial burden or deprivation of liberty it will become little
more than a redundant echo of the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses. Professor Gey, for example, argues that a
deprivation-of-liberty approach to the Establishment Clause
"would seem to leave little for the Establishment Clause to do"
because it would apply primarily to governmental actions that
"already violate the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clauses."'82
I disagree with this view. Only laws that burden a sincerely
held religious belief trigger the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, for
example, some Christians might have a sincerely held, free-
exercise-of-religion objection to a law requiring them to eat only
kosher foods in order to satisfy the dietary requirements of the
Jewish religion.'83 On the other hand, a secular person-
someone who has no religious objection to the kosher-food-only
law-would not have a religious conscience claim under the Free
Exercise Clause. However, everyone, including all secular
dissenters, would have a claim under the incorporated
Establishment Clause, because this law imposes a substantial
182. Gey, supra note 130, at 42, 56.
183. Some Christians may interpret the Apostle Peter's vision, reported in Acts 10
and 11, as a command that Christians should not be compelled to follow the dietary laws
of the Old Testament. See Acts 10-11 (ESV). In Acts 10, Peter had a vision from God
commanding him to kill and eat "all kinds of animals and reptiles and birds" because no
animal made by God is "unclean." Acts 10:9-16 (ESV).
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burden on the liberty not to be compelled by law to follow
religious practices.
Similarly, a secular owner of a bar would have a claim under
the Establishment Clause against a law that gives churches veto
authority over liquor licenses issued to bars and restaurants
located in the vicinity of the church.1 4 Although such a
delegation of governmental authority to a religious institution
over secular businessmen would clearly burden the liberty
protected by the incorporated Establishment Clause,'15 it would
not appear to raise a claim under either the Free Speech or Free
Exercise Clause.
In other words, the Establishment Clause protects a secular
liberty-the individual right to choose whether to participate in
a religious activity or to comply with a religious requirement-
whereas the Free Exercise Clause gives citizens the right to "obey
spiritual rather than temporal authority."86 A secular person-
one who recognizes no religious authority-would never have a
free exercise claim, because he would never have a sincerely held
religious objection to the law. The libertarian Establishment
Clause, however, does protect burdens on secular liberty from
laws requiring religious conformity. Thus, "properly understood,
the two clauses are symmetrical and complementary-not
redundant." 7
V. A NARRATIVE AND A CONCLUSION
A. Narrative: Why Do I Care About Religious Symbols in the Public
Culture?
When I discuss the issue of passive religious displays in the
public culture I am often asked why I care so much about such a
trivial issue. Why do I want a nativity display, a Ten
Commandments monument, or a Holocaust memorial featuring
a Star of David to be placed in the public square?
My answer to these questions is to state that I do not
particularly want the government to put up any displays in public
184. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that a
Massachusetts law giving churches veto power over governmental liquor-licensing
authority violated the Establishment Clause).
185. Id. at 123.
186. McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 103, at 174.
187. Id. at 153 n.176.
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buildings and spaces. As someone with Rand Paulian libertarian
instincts, I prefer a quiet government, a government that
decorates public buildings in calm, earth tones, and which
maintains public spaces with well-maintained grass lawns, flowers
and trees. I want government to be seen and not heard.
But our government is not a quiet one; it constantly decorates
public spaces with displays, symbols, and celebrations of all sorts.
And when it decides to include a symbolic display acknowledging
a religious holiday or something of similar significance to a
religious subgroup in the community, and when offended
observers seek to extirpate that display precisely because it
recognizes religion as a valued part of the lives of many citizens
in the Republic, all bets are off. I will rush to defend the
religious symbol against censorship and the tyranny of the
offended observer.
Nothing in the First Amendment requires courts to empower
one group of citizens to act as censors over which passive symbols
are accessible to other citizens who wish to view them. I am tired
of the war on Christmas, the war on the Ten Commandments,
and the war on the Star of David. Heckler's vetoes are anathema
to the First Amendment, and the Establishment Clause should
not be interpreted to grant them to offended observers who have
suffered no deprivation of liberty.
But what of the secular student who feels like an "outsider"
when a public school puts up a display recognizing a religious
holiday?' 8 Well, in light of the fact that the dominant motif of
public schools is otherwise almost strictly secular, there is no
cause for alarm because secular students are the true insiders
and religious students are the true outsiders. If a visitor from a
distant galaxy toured public schools today, he would "not be
aware that religion has played-and still plays-a major role in
history, philosophy, science, and the ordinary lives of many
millions of Americans." 8 1 Public schools have become engines of
secularization in our society,190 and a few passive religious
188. See Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression, supra note 40, at 608 n.3.
189. Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion
in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163, 181 [hereinafter McConnell, "God is Dead
and We Have Killed Him! ].
190. "A secular school does not necessarily produce atheists, but it produces young
adults who inevitably think of religion as extraneous to the real world of intellectual
inquiry, if they think of religion at all." Id. Thus, McConnell concludes that "government
has become a major factor in the secularization of society." Id. See also Michael W.
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displays should not make secular children feel like outsiders in
predominantly secular public schools. For a public school to
passively recognize that "[u]nsecular America""' still exists,
despite rumors to the contrary, does not harm any child nor
deprive any child of liberty under the incorporated
Establishment Clause.
If we truly care about neutrality in the public square and equal
regard for all subgroups in the community, then religious
displays should not be cleansed from a public square open to all
sorts of secular displays. A strictly secular public culture is
neither neutral between religion and nonreligion, nor is it a true
reflection of the religious pluralism of our diverse society. It
sends a message that people of faith are political outsiders, and
that religion is not an important part of the culture. I will stand
athwart that message until my last breath.
B. Conclusion
As Sanford Levinson observes: "Those who overthrow regimes
often take as one of their first tasks the physical destruction of
symbols-and the latent power possessed by these markers-of
those whom they have displaced."'9 2 As America becomes an
increasingly secular society, and as unsecular America is
overthrown by secular America, we should not be surprised to
see secularists march from sea to shining sea symbolically
burning religious displays and monuments to cleanse the public
culture of religious symbols. But if we focus seriously on liberty
under the incorporated Establishment Clause, we will strip "the
mask of the law"' from this purposeful attempt to distort the
public culture so that it no longer reflects the rich diversity and
McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146, 162 (1986)
("Studious silence on a subject that parents may say touches all of life is an eloquent
refutation.").
191. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!", supra note 189, at 166.
192. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 12 (1998).
193. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN,JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WY'THE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 25 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002) (1976).
Courts and judges often use legal masks and metaphors, such as the "wall of separation,"
to disguise an unpopular or harsh legal rule. The most egregious example of legal
masking, of course, was "the masking of humanity" by a legal system that insisted that
slaves were "property" not human beings. Thus, "[i]t was difficult for participants in the
legal process to think they acted badly when they applied the mask the law provided to
hide humanity. It was difficult for anyone in their society to think that what such
intelligent, enlightened, liberal men were doing was wrong." JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A
PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 153 (1979).
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religious pluralism of the community.
Whenever government speaks through a symbol or display in
the public square, some citizens will be pleased and some will be
offended: war monuments may offend pacifists; gay pride
displays may offend social conservatives; Columbus Day displays
may offend those who identify with indigenous population
groups; Confederate flags and monuments may offend African-
Americans; and Christmas displays featuring a nativity scene or
Holocaust memorials featuring a Star of David may offend strict
separationists.'9 4 But each of these displays also will have a willing
audience that seeks an opportunity to view the display. As
Professor Marshall has observed, "[o]utside the establishment
area, the state's use of controversial symbols does not give rise to
constitutional concern no matter how offensive those symbols
might be" to offended observers.'"5 To put it differently, outside
the establishment area, the Court will not give offended
observers a heckler's veto over the content of the public square.
The remedy for those who suffer "symbolic alienation"19 6 is to
avoid the offensive display, not to censor the content of the
public square.
The same should be true for passive, state-sponsored religious
displays challenged under the incorporated Establishment
Clause. Under the Court's own theory of incorporation, only
when a religious display amounts to a substantial deprivation of
individual liberty should the courts act to protect offended
observers under the Establishment Clause. The Establishment
Clause should not be interpreted to grant one group of citizens a
heckler's veto empowering it to censor which public displays
another group of citizens may view in the public square. In other
words, so long as offended observers may avert their eyes or
otherwise reasonably avoid the objectionable religious display,
the Establishment Clause is satisfied and the issue is left to be
decided at the level of state and local government.'9
194. See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 358-59 (1991).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 357.
197. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided Town of Greece v.
Galloway, a 5-4 decision upholding the practice of government-sponsored, ceremonial
prayer, including sectarian prayer, at meetings of local legislative bodies. Town of Greece
v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014). In Galloway, Justice Kennedy addressed the issue of
citizens who are offended by the sectarian content of legislative prayer and concluded:
"legislative bodies do not engage in impermissible coercion merely by exposing
300 Vol. 18
The Establishment Clause as Heckler's Veto
A public culture cleansed of religious displays is neither
neutral nor is it a true reflection of the diversity and pluralism of
the community it is designed to reflect. The Establishment
Clause is not violated by a "broadly inclusive public [culture], in
which the public is presented a wide variety of perspectives,
religious ones included."'9 8  If public schools and local
governments display "many different cultural symbols during the
course of the year,"19' there should be no Establishment Clause
concerns when religious symbols, such as nativity scenes,
menorahs, or Holocaust memorials featuring a Star of David, are
also displayed. 00 Constitutional scrutiny should be reserved for
displays that somehow impose substantial burdens on the liberty
of offended observers. 20 1
It is a constitutional tragedy when the Court interprets the
incorporated Establishment Clause to deny to a willing audience
the liberty to view and enjoy a religious display for no better
reason than to appease the hurt feelings of offended observers
whose liberty is in no way burdened by the challenged symbol.
Rather than protecting individual liberty under the First
Amendment, Justice Black and the Everson Court incorporated
an extra-constitutional metaphor with a very tainted historical
pedigree. But this is easy to correct. All the Court need do when
evaluating passive religious displays under the Establishment
Clause is to keep its focus on liberty rather than on adding yet
another brick in the wall keeping religious citizens from
inclusion in a public square open to everyone else.
constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and in which they need not
participate." Id. at 1827. So long as offended observers are not "singled out... for
opprobrium" and are not "dissuaded from leaving the meeting room during the prayer,
arriving late, or even, as happened here, making a later protest," there is no
Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 1826-27.
198. McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 103, at 193.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. Professor McConnell believes that "U]udicial scrutiny should be reserved for
cases in which a particular religious position is given such public prominence that the
overall message becomes one of conformity rather than pluralism." Id. at 193-94. Even
here, the "best solution" is for "members of minority religions . . . to request fair
treatment of alternative traditions, rather than censorship of more mainstream
[religious] symbols." Id. at 193.
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